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Trade Liberalization and Obstacles to Food
Security: Toward a Sustainable
Food Sovereignty
Peter Halewood*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rising global food prices during 2010 and 2011 are thought to
be partly responsible for the recent political uprisings and regime
changes in the Middle East.' The 2008 global spikes in food prices
and the consequent food riots around the world lent additional
urgency to analysis of underlying structural problems in the
global system of producing, trading, and delivering food.2 Global
food insecurity (hunger) is likely to increase again if population
increase, climate change, biofuel production, agricultural com-
modity trading,' and global trade imbalances persist or expand.
Unfortunately, the internationally recognized human right to food
has been to date relatively ineffective in stemming the tide of food
insecurity in the Global South.' This essay identifies and analyzes
some of the major dynamics in trade law as they relate to food
insecurity and argues that, while it does not replace the right to
food, the concept of food sovereignty advances discussion of these
issues both as domestic and international legal matters and, just
as importantly, as a vehicle for building political coalition both
domestically and transnationally. Food sovereignty can rally
opposition and resistance to global capital's hegemonic construc-
tion of equality, markets, and food itself.
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. Many thanks to the organizers of the
LatCrit South-North Exchange, "The Global Politics of Food: Sustainability and
Subordination," May 6-8, 2010 in Mexico City, where I gave a talk upon which this
paper is based. I also want to thank Peter Apostol, Adam Staier, and Megan Thisse
for research assistance, and the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review for
editorial assistance.
1. Soaring Food Prices Hit Poor Countries, Spur Farmers, (NPR News Radio
Broadcast Febuary 27, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/02/27/134069431/
soaring-food-prices-hit-poor-countries-spur-farmers.
2. See Frederick Kaugman, The Food Bubble: How Wall Street Starved Millions
and Got Away with It, Harper's, July 2010, at 28.
3. Id. at 27; see also Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Raises Food Concerns As Global
Food Prices Jump, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2010, at A4 (discussing the unrest already
occurring in parts of the world due the current rise in global wheat prices).
4. See David Fazzino, The Meaning and Relevance of Food Security in the Context
of Current Globalization Trends, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 435, 439 (2004).
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Several issues recur in scholarly discussion of the right to food
and food (in)security. The first is how/whether the international
community recognizes, interprets, and enforces the right to food.'
The second is how international trade generally intersects with
the right to food and food security.6 The third is quite distinct:
how intellectual property rights affect the right to food security.'
Global investment in and production of biofuels is an additional
vector in distorting global food prices as agricultural products
ordinarily used primarily for food, such as corn and sugar, are con-
verted to fuel. These issues play out against a larger conceptual
and political backdrop: the neo-liberal contract-based investment/
return model of trade versus the human rights-based sustainable,
ecological model." There has been a collision - incompletely theo-
rized - of human rights and biodiversity principles on one hand
with extant trade law principles on the other.
My aim in this essay is to begin to theorize this intersection
around the concept of food sovereignty so as to advance and con-
tribute to critical discussion. Human rights law, particularly the
right to food', can be used to place checks on trade law either by
express incorporation of human rights law in future trade negotia-
tions or by interpreting existing trade law as requiring consis-
tency with global human rights norms. Neither approach seems
particularly likely to succeed. The food sovereignty movement
suggests, among other things, that food and agriculture be
removed from the purview of global trade law and institutions
such as the WTO.1o While the human right to food is in a sense a
negative, limiting right against states, food sovereignty suggests a
broader, more expansive right: a robust right of nutritional and
agricultural self-determination.
5. Anthony Paul Kearns III, The Right to Food Exists via Customary
International Law, 22 Suffolk Transnat'1 L. Rev. 223, 256 (1998).
6. Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 691, 697 (2006).
7. See Fazzino, supra note 4, at 443.
8. See id. at 450.
9. See Steve Charnovitz, The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World
Trade Organization, 96 Am. J. Int'l. L. 28, 30 (2002); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/enldocuments/udhr/ ("Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and his family, including food,
clothing housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.").
10. See PETER ROSSET, FOOD Is DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO OUT OF
AGRICULTURE xiv (Zed Books Ltd. 2006).
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INTERNATIONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD
The universal right to food was first recognized in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.n The right to food was
then codified in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).12 The Covenant has
been accepted in 160 countries and reads in pertinent part:
The States Parties to the present covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for him-
self and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living con-
ditions. The States parties will take appropriate steps to
ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this
effect the essential importance of international co-opera-
tion based on free consent. 3
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is
responsible for monitoring this covenant and in doing so has
issued non-binding General Comments." General Comment 12
focuses on the broad interpretation of the right to food and the
obligation of countries to make food both economically and physi-
cally accessible.6 As Wenonah Hauter explains:
General Comment 12 sets out a three-part typology detail-
ing how states can meet their obligations: states have a
duty to respect, protect, and fulfill. The obligation to
respect requires that states avoid taking actions that deny
or make it difficult to gain access and availability to ade-
quate food. The obligation to protect requires that states
act to ensure that other enterprises or individuals do not
deprive individuals of their access to and the availability of
adequate food. Finally, the obligation to fulfill incorporates
both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.
The obligation to facilitate means the state must proac-
tively engage in activities to strengthen people's access to,
and utilization of, resources and means to ensure their live-
11. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 9, at Article 25.
12. Wenonah Hauter, The Limits of International Human Rights Law and the
Role of Food Sovereignty in Protecting People from Further Trade Liberalization
Under the Doha Round Negotiations, 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1071, 1083-84 (2007).
13. Id. at 1084 (citing International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights [ICESCRI, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 11(1) (Dec. 16, 1976), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm).
14. Id. at 1084-85 (citing Office of the United Nations High Commn'r for Human
Rights, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Fact Sheet No.16
(Rev. 1) § 6, (July, 1991) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fsl6.htm).
15. Hauter, supra note 12, at 1085-1086.
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lihood. The duty to provide requires that states fulfill the
right to adequate food when people cannot do so themselves
for reasons beyond their control. States can violate the
right to adequate food through either actions or omissions.
States do have a defense: a state does not violate the right
to food if it is simply unable to comply, but only when it is
unwilling to do so, or when it discriminates and denies the
right to some people.16
A tension exists between what might be referred to as eco-
nomic versus human rights models of poverty reduction and food
security. In the initial movement to prevent hunger and poverty,
there was often a focus on solely economic statistics (e.g., GDP, $1/
day poverty thresholds) that were poor indicators of actual condi-
tions throughout the world." In reaction to this, a widespread
push toward practical country-specific self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction was initiated." This continues to be the focus of interna-
tional commentary aimed at ensuring that the human right to
food is respected, although trade and food imports are not necessa-
rily negatively correlated with food security. Through focusing on
local food production, the right to food is better practically pro-
tected than in post hoc adjudication, as the justiciability of the
human right to food is not guaranteed by each state and there are
concerns about extraterritorial application of the right." None-
theless, many IFIs' (international financial institutions) policies
remain informed by "economic" modeling and focus on GDP and
other measures as indicative of real economic development.2 0
There has long been argument about the lack of enforcement
measures for economic, social and cultural rights when individu-
als or groups have complaints against states.2 1 Since 2004 the UN
has developed an optional protocol (opened for signature in 2009)
16. Id. (citing U.N. Comm on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCRI, Substantive
Issues Arising In The Implementation Of The International Covenant On Economic,
Social And Cultural Rights: General Comment 12, "The Right To Adequate Food"
(Art. 11), U.N. Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter Right to Adequate
Food], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsfl(Symbol)/3d02758c707031d58
025677f003b73b9).
17. ASBJORN EIDE, FOOD AS A HuMAN RIGHT 3 (A. Eide et al. eds., United Nations
University Press 1984).
18. Id.
19. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Steward, Justiciability of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health? 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 462, 491
(2004).
20. Id. at 500.
21. Id. at 462-63.
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to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR") permitting the investigation of claims against
states.2 2 Recommendations could be made to state respondents
about how to bring their law into compliance, similar to the mech-
anism available to individuals under the First Optional Protocol
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Social and
cultural rights are to be "progressively realized" (as opposed to
civil and political rights which are enforceable if self-executing or
implemented in domestic legislation) and thus have spawned a
flurry of academic discussion on the justiciability and enforceabil-
ity of such rights.23 Arguably, the right to food as customary inter-
national law is binding even on states which have not ratified the
ICESCR. Few countries recognize a right for individuals to bring
ICESCR related complaints solely on the basis that the treaty has
been ratified.2 4 While many countries have language guarantee-
ing the right to food in their constitutions 25, few have made this
right enforceable in the courts.2 6 Thus there is little uniformity in
terms of how signatories have incorporated the right to food into
their domestic legal systems.
There is likewise a good deal of debate about the extraterrito-
rial effect of the right to food.27 Is it possible that one country or a
transnational corporation could be liable for the effects its actions
have on food supply in another country? US exports of corn to
Mexico under NAFTA in the mid-2000s is a prime example of this
phenomenon. U.S. subsidy of its own corn industry resulted in
cheap corn which flooded the Mexican market, partly in a mis-
guided attempt by the Mexican government to cater to short term
consumer preference. US corn was imported so cheaply and at
such a high volume that it largely destroyed domestic Mexican
corn production, driving out small and even corporate corn farm-
ers throughout Mexico.28
22. Id.
23. See id.; see also Hauter, supra note 12 at 1086.
24. See id. at 1089.
25. See Jim Yardley, India Asks: Should Food Be a Right for the Poor?, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 2010 (explaining that in India there is discussion of creating a new
constitutional right to food).
26. See Hauter, supra note 12, at 1089.
27. See Narula, supra note 6 at 724-27.
28. Id. at 1093; Sandra Polanski, Br. Submitted to the Can. Standing S. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, Mexican Employment, Productivity And Income A Decade After
NAFTA, (2004), available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=1473; see generally Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Law, Food, and
Culture: Mexican Corn's National Identity Cooked in "Tortilla Discourses" Post-TLC/
NAFTA, 20 St. Thomas L. Rev. 573 (2008).
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By removing price floors and food-security reserves, the U.S.
had triggered a collapse in the price of U.S. agricultural products,
including corn.2 9 US corn imports into Mexico soared as a result of
this confluence of factors."0 Poorer rural farmers in Mexico were
unable to shift to production of other crops. As the fallout from
NAFTA continued, one unexpected side effect was the lack of
growth for employment needs in manufacturing.3 As poorer
farmers lost their land and were unable to find work in manufac-
turing industries after migrating to cities, poverty and wage stag-
nation occurred.3 2 If the extra-territorial effects of the signatories
can make them liable, countries could be prevented from subsi-
dizing their own agricultural sectors in cases like these. The U.S.
could be liable to those Mexican farmers that were affected by the
corn imports. More importantly, these farmers, or groups on their
behalf, could bring suit to force a more balanced approach to
trade. Likewise, Mexico itself could be liable for removing import
caps during this period."
TRADE AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD
While some anti-globalists decry free trade altogether, many
development economists are instead critical of how trade liberali-
zation is being implemented (Stiglitz, Chimni, et.al.)." But there
is general agreement that "two key trade policies. . . perpetuate
hunger: agricultural subsidies in rich countries, and forced
"135removal of tariffs in poor ones.
One of the primary issues that the Doha Round of discussions
29. FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL., GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INSTITUTE, FREE TRADE, CORN, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
US - MEXICO CORN TRADE UNDER NAFTA 16-17 (2003), available at http://ase.tufts.
edulgdae/pubs/wp/03-06-naftacorn.pdf.
30. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Mexico's Corn Industry and U.S. Mexico Corn Trade,
AMBER WAVES (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/june04/findings/
charts/findingMexicocorn_400.gif.
31. See Hauter, supra note 12, at 1076.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL (2005) (arguing that
poorer countries should move toward free trade gradually, and that richer countries
should help poorer ones prepare for trade.); JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (W. W. Norton & Co. 2002) (arguing that policies based on neo-
liberal assumptions are fundamentally unsound, and there are desirable government
interventions which, in principle, can improve upon the efficiency of the market.); B.
S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS; A LEGAL STUDY (Routledge,
Kegan & Paul 1987) (examining international commodity agreements in terms of
political economy, effectiveness, and in the context of free trade).
35. CANADIAN FOOD SECURITY POLICY GROUP, A FOOD SECURITY PERSPECTIVE ON
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was to address was the issue of agricultural subsidies in wealthy
nations throughout the world. Wealthy nations had maintained
theses protections during the creation of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO)and advanced a notion of future removal over time.36
The two primary actors on the wealthy side are the European
Union (EU) and the United States spending an estimated com-
bined $ $114 billion on agricultural subsidies." The European
Union spends an estimated $79 billion per year (55 billion
Euros)." EU subsidies are distributed through Europe's Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP)." France is Europe's largest agricul-
tural producer and accordingly receives the largest share of these
subsidies from the EU, nearly 10 billion Euros of agricultural sub-
sidization in 2008.40
CAP was initiated after World War II as a means to develop
and accelerate Europe's food production capabilities; the agricul-
tural program has grown to the point where it accounts for nearly
half of the EU's spending budget." A result of the subsidy pro-
gram over the decades was a large surplus of food." The subsidy
funds still flow to EU countries today despite these price deflating
excesses. They support, and in some cases prop up, agricultural
enterprises that some suggest are incapable of competing in the
global market on their own." While some European countries are
large financial contributors, they receive a comparatively small
amount of the subsidies.4 4 For example, in Great Britain and the
Netherlands, the size of their agricultural industries are smaller
compared to those of a country such as France, yet their relative
CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES 1 (2004),
available at http://www.chs.ubc.ca/archives/?q=node/776.
36. Brandon Petelin, The United States and International Trade: The Implications
of Noncompliance with Dispute Settlement Panel Rulings, 23 T. M. Cooley L. Rev. 545,
559-60 (2006).
37. See Jack Thurston, Does the CAP fit?, FOLLOW THE MONEY (February 4, 2010)
http://www.followthemoney.eu/does-the-cap-fit/; see also Chris Edwards, Agricultural
Subsidies, DOWNSIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (June 2009), http://www.down
sizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies.
38. Thurston, supra note 37.
39. Stephen Castle & Doreen Carvajal, Europe's Vast Farm Subsidies Face
Challenges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2009, at B1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Henry Samuel, French Farmers Survive but Multinationals Cash in on EU
Subsidies, THE TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 30, 2009) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/europe/france/6111715/French-farmers-survive-but-multinationals-cash-in-on-
EU-subsidies.html.
44. See Castle & Carvajal, supra note 39, at Bl.
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wealth remains high, requiring those countries to contribute
heavily.5
This disparity has led to internal pressures to re-evaluate the
spending scheme of agricultural food subsidies in Europe. While
the internal EU political debate over these subsidies carries on,
the agricultural assistance program is set for revision in 2013.46
Among the issues to be discussed are the roles of newly admitted
EU members, formerly of the eastern bloc. These countries were
denied an equal share of the subsidy program during the last
negotiation but now wield significantly more clout than before. In
addition to any potential debates about redistribution amongst
the EU members, the newly implemented accounting measures
imposed on all twenty-seven EU member countries have helped
illuminate the trail of where the funds actually go. 47 There has
been much outcry already as critics in many countries point to
money being given to non-farmers throughout Europe.48 These
paper trails will surely intensify an ongoing debate over when,
where and how much money the EU needs to spend on subsidizing
its agricultural sector.
As the EU's internal policies regarding agricultural subsidies
undergo scrutiny, the daily role these subsidies play in the world
market continue.4 1 While many are hopeful that the subsidy pro-
gram will begin a process of change, the current system continues
to adversely affect those in competition with the subsidized agri-
cultural products. These subsidies still pose an impediment to
breaking the deadlock in the Doha round of discussions. Many
less developed countries fear that their domestic agricultural sec-
tors are not adequately protected from potential food surpluses
created by the food subsidies of the wealthier nations in the
WTO.so This leads to debilitating effects on these countries abil-
ity to sustain, protect and grow their domestic agricultural
sectors.
While it does not have as high levels of agricultural subsidy
as does the EU, the United States' refusal to reduce farm subsi-
dies was seen by many to be a primary cause of the stalling of the
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See generally, Richard Mshomba, How Northern Subsidies Hurt Africa, AFRICA
RECOVERY, 29 (September 2002) (discussing how subsidies reduce world food prices,
but also reduce the incomes of African farmers).
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Doha Round trade negotiation in 2006.1 The U.S. economy's
larger size compared to the EU's means its impact is felt more
thoroughly in other parts of the world. The United States spends
an estimated $10-30 billion per year on farm subsidies.5 2 These
subsidies are distributed over a multitude of states, to both pri-
vately owned farms and large scale corporate farms." The farm-
ers that receive subsidies cover a broad range of American farm
exports.' By subsidizing the American agricultural industry, the
United States guarantees a price floor for these goods, which pro-
vides stability and security to the farmers who produce these
crops. 5 Subsidies make crops cheaper to produce, lowering prices
on the world market and disadvantaging poor farmers in devel-
oped countries.
Selling subsidized food coupled with import tariffs that are
reduced to the point of irrelevancy due to WTO rules, these goods
effectively reduce developing countries' farmers' profits.5 6 In
many instances the price these artificially supported goods sell for
threatens to wipe out entire farm sectors in poorer countries
because there is simply no profit to be made by indigenous farm-
ers. At the same time, American and European farmers are insu-
lated from the competition that other countries could pose on an
equally competitive field." In developing countries in particular,
there are serious concerns that fledgling agricultural industries-
or long established ones such as Mexican corn-will be driven out
of business." By reducing agricultural production profits in these
developing countries, farm subsidies have the effect of eroding the
infrastructure and wealth of poor countries throughout the world.
This correlates directly with food insecurity, affecting both the
domestic supply of food and the price of imported food. There is
51. See Brandon Petelin, The United States and International Trade: The
Implications of Noncompliance with Dispute Settlement Panel Rulings, 23 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 545, 560 (2006).
52. Chris Edwards, Agricultural Subsidies, THE CATO INsnTuTE, (June 2009)
available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies.
53. See id
54. See id.
55. See generally Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice
Implications for International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2010)
(explaining the current debate of global wealth redistribution, including subsidies,
and discussing the relational duties between developed and undeveloped countries.).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Amy Clark, Is NAFTA Good for Mexico's Farmers?, CBS NEWS, (February
11, 2009) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/01/eveningnews/main
1773839.shtml.
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general consensus that in the wake of the WTO, LDCs markets
are now more open than those of developed countries, an imbal-
ance which does not benefit the agricultural sector in LDCs.6'
AMELIORATING EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON
DEVELOPING NATIONS
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") specifically references the inter-
national trade dimensions of the right to food.60 The international
framework for agricultural trade is led by the Agreement on Agri-
culture (AoA) of the Uruguay Round of negations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now subsumed within
the WTO.61 This marks the first time in the history of trade law
that agriculture was specifically included in the trade regime, and
that basic trade law principles such as most-favored-nation (MFN)
and national treatment apply to agricultural products.62 The
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) enables enforce-
ment through WTO authorized unilateral trade sanctions by one
59. See Martin Khor, WTO Ministerial Outcome Imbalanced Against Developing
Countries, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/
twninfo339.htm.
60. See ICESCR, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A (Dec. 16, 1976), available at www.c-
fam.org/docLib/20080625 ICESCR.pdf. ("1. The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The State Parties will take appropriate steps to
ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance
of international co-operation based on free consent. 2. The States Parties to the
present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from
hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures
including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of
production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and
scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most
efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account
the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.").
61. See Christine Kaufman & Simone Heri, Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture and
Food Security - Mission Impossible?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1039, 1042-43 (2007);
see also Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human Rights:
Options for the Integration of the Right to Food into the Agreement on Agriculture, 10
Max Planck Yearbook of U.N. Law 127 (2006), available at http://www.mpil.de/
shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/05_kerstiniii.pdf. On the general linkage of trade law
and human rights, see generally the excellent recent book, BERTA ESPERANZA
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LINKING
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009).
62. See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International
Trade Law in the United States, 12 Aniz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 102 (1995).
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state against another, and the WTO introduces substantive mini-
mum standards for the first time in many areas of law, notably
intellectual property law through the TRIPS agreement. Each of
these impact agriculture and food.
Arguably, the right to food may be violated in cases where
international trade agreements artificially lower the price of
imported goods- including agricultural goods- through subsi-
dies or other mechanisms which in turn drive prices of local goods
down and bankrupt local producers.63 The United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization's research concludes that the
exports of developing nations very rarely increase while cheaper
imports increase dramatically.' Given these trends, it is intuitive
that local production should be protected in order to prevent local
agricultural infrastructure breakdown and reliance on foreign
imports.65 Among the potential remedies is the implementation of
special and differential treatment in trade agreements regarding
agricultural goods.
Protections for agriculture aimed at providing food security
can be realized by allowing lesser developed countries longer time
periods to implement agreements.6 6 This allows these countries
the time to properly plan and organize their economies to protect
their agricultural stability. In addition, by ensuring that these
countries have the support and advice to aid the development and
stability of their infrastructure to ensure food security and guard
against hunger. If provided on an individual basis, allowing a
lesser developed country to achieve stability in food production
will greatly advance the effort to improve the financial condition
of the poorest members of that country.67 By stabilizing food pro-
duction, the lower income farmers in poorer countries benefit by
earning profits that allow them to purchase food and stave off
63. See Hauter, supra note 12, at 1078-81.
64. See id. at 1080.
65. See Carmen G. Gonzdlez, China in Latin America: Law, Economics, and
Sustainable Development, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. 10170, 10180 (2010). For a thorough and
persuasive overview of law and food security issues see generally, Carmen G.
GonzAlez, The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the Elusive Quest for Justice, 13
YALE Hum. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 462 (2010).
66. WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Special and Differential
Treatment for Least Developed Countries, WT/COMTD/W/135 (Oct. 5, 2004), available
at httpf//www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/devspecial-differential-provisionse.
htm.
67. See John Nash & Donald Mitchell, How Freer Trade Can Help Feed The Poor,
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 2005), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/
2005/03/pdf/nash.pdf.
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hunger.68
Another remedy that would aid lesser developed countries in
their pursuit of food security is the establishment and protections
afforded by special safeguards for price volatility. By adopting
polices that help low income farmers to mitigate damages which
accompany unpredictable events that would otherwise overwhelm
their abilities to cope with sudden price surges, lesser developed
countries can contribute to the stability of its people's economic
livelihood." Protection of low income farmers and food security
could be further advanced by exempting food staples from tariff
reductions. Proposed exemptions have included granting lesser
developed countries the ability to ban dumping of developed coun-
tries' agricultural products in their markets.o By preventing the
dumping of large quantities of goods into their markets, lesser
developed countries are able to maintain some stability in their
domestic markets. In addition, they are able to protect the low and
middle income farmers from the damaging effects of agricultural
price decline. One proposal called a "negative list approach"
allows lesser developed countries to add a certain number of food
staples to a list which exempts them from lowering tariffs on these
goods."
Trade liberalization can have detrimental effects on the long
term food security of less developed countries. This includes the
environmental damage that may result from a country's attempt
to satisfy export demand. Rather than working under environ-
mentally friendly standards or sustainability models for agricul-
ture, forestry or fish stocks, many countries are forced to grapple
with the global demand for these goods which, despite the envi-
ronmental damage that attends, outweighs the country's need to
provide long term security. Results have been mixed. The Inter-
national Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna has
failed to reverse the depletion of tuna stock in the Atlantic."
68. See id.
69. See ORG. FOR ECON. DEV. AND COOPERATION & FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG.,
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 2010 (2010), available at http://www.agri-outlook.org/
dataoecd/31/4/45453906.pdf.
70. See Briefing of Agriculture Negotiations, The Issues and Where We Are Now,
20-23, 63, (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agrice/agnegs bkgrnd-
e.pdf.
71. Duncan Green & Shishir Priyadarshi, FAO Geneva Roundtable On Special
And Differential Treatment In The Context Of The WTO Negotiations on Agriculture
(Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.fao.org/trade/docs/Green-Priyadarshi.htm.
72. ENVTL. LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ENVTL. LAw: A GLOBAL AUDIT/ASSESSMENT,
§ 8:48 (2010).
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Many fishing countries were reluctant to sign the Convention,
fearing a detriment to their current finances.13 Forest conserva-
tion efforts are another area where policy changes have been slow
to take effect. Internationally traded tropical timber was sched-
uled to come exclusively from sustainable sources by 2000." That
goal, ten years later, has still not been achieved.75 NAFTA, for
example, has been linked to an increase in water pollution from
nitrogen in areas where increased farming has taken place as a
result of the Trade Agreement.76 Farm subsidies reduce the price
of nitrogen based fertilizer so much that little effort is made to
prevent run-off loss into Gulf waterways.
Brazil was subject to a WTO dispute when it attempted to ban
imports of retreaded tires from the EU based on concerns about
threats to human health and the environment. Brazil claimed
that the tires, when discarded, added to the creation of stagnant
pools of water that increased the mosquito population." The mos-
quitoes in turn carry malaria and other diseases, presenting a
serious health hazard to Brazilians. In addition, Brazil claimed
that the tires lead to toxic leaching into the soil."o The European
Community initiated a complaint before a WTO panel. The Appel-
late Body eventually agreed with the EC; the body found that Bra-
zil's import ban was a permitted measure under GATT aimed at
protecting health but was nonetheless unjustified discrimination
because Brazil allowed the import of retreaded tires from partici-
pating MERCOSUR countries." Legitimate concerns about
threats to the environment and public health were sidelined by
the WTO process. Another example is fertilizer run-off from Amer-
ican farms and the resulting depletion of marine life in the Gulf of
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Scott Vaughn, The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?: Measuring The
Environmental Impacts Of Agricultural Liberalization, in NAFTA's PROMISE AND
REAIUTY: LESSONS FROM MEXIcO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 61, 67-68, 73 (Audley et al.
eds., 2004).
77. See Keith E. Sealing, Attack of the Balloon People: How America's Food
Culture and Agricultural Policies Threaten The Food Security of the Poor, Farmers,
and Indigenous Peoples of the World, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1015, 1028 (2007)
(citing RIcHARD IMANNING, AGAINST THE GRAIN 72 (2004)).
78. Chris Wold, Taking Stock: Trade's Environmental Scorecard after Twenty
Years of "Trade and Environment," 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 328 (2010).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 328-329.
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Mexico." Run-off from nitrogen fertilizer on farms, carried to the
Gulf by the Mississippi River, has contributed to the development
of a 20 thousand square kilometer dead zone where shrimp and
fish cannot survive." This depletion of fisheries is precisely the
sort of threat that developing countries need to be wary of. The
long term impact of current policies such as this can have a nega-
tive impact for Mexicans who depend upon these resources for
food or livelihood.
Trade liberalization often has the distorting effect of shifting
the limited amount of resources a less developed country may
have from production geared towards local consumption to pro-
duction for export to the global market. While the net benefit of
producing goods for export may be high, it comes at a steep price
for many people in poor countries. Many poor countries have lim-
ited arable land to grow food, a limited workforce to work the
farms due to urbanization, and limited capital to support produc-
tion for local consumption. Agriculture employs nearly seventy
percent of the labor force in poor countries around the world' and
it is a major contributor to their GDP.6 With so many people tied
to agrarian economies in poor countries, a tension exists between
providing the land and labor for agriculture required for food
security, and the reduction of poverty and hunger, and the use of
the land for export agriculture to satisfy global market demand.
This is perhaps most acute in tropical countries where the pres-
sures of the global market to grow food for export often results in
insufficient production for local consumption.
Complicating the plight of food insecure populations is the
profit derived from growing goods for the export market.
Although trade benefits may be greater when certain foods are in
high market demand around the world and only certain countries
can grow that food, the poor in an exporting country typically are
not in a position to secure many of those benefits. Instead, these
profits are diverted to other industries or to large transnational
corporations who have set up industrial farming operations in
developing countries." These enterprises locate there to exploit
low relative labor costs and/or perhaps the country's unique abil-
ity to grow certain agricultural goods in demand on the global
82. See Sealing, supra note 77, at 1028.
83. See id.
84. See Green, supra note 71, at § 2.
85. See id.
86. See Castle & Carvajal, supra note 39 at B1.
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market." Foreign corporations competing with poor farmers often
contribute little to long-term economic development. Further con-
sequences of trade liberalization for development and food secur-
ity include:"
- Excessive production for foreign markets can lead to envi-
ronmental damage, depleting agricultural lands, fish
stocks, and water resources.
- Export oriented food production may divert resources
such as land, labor, and capital away from production for
local communities. . ..
- Although earnings from export conceivably could be used
to import cheap food for those most in need, usually they
are not used in that way. The poor are not the ones who
decide how foreign exchange earnings are spent.
- The benefits of trade between parties of unequal power
will be distributed unevenly, with the result that the gap
between them widens steadily.
- The volume of exports from developing nations, and even
the price, may not be a good indicator of the extent to
which the people of those nations draw economic benefit
from the trade. Many food production operations in
developing nations are controlled by companies from
developed nations.
- Excessive promotion of exports can lead to weakening
commodity prices, to the disadvantage of exporting
nations."
These issues were hotly debated during the Doha round of the
WTO talks.90 There have now been years of negotiations without
any real agricultural trade agreements resulting in part from
resistance by developing nations who fear low priced imports with
which they are unable to compete.91 The G-20 talks in Toronto,
Canada in June, 2010 indicate that Doha may be even more
delayed and dysfunctional than previously thought. Agricultural
trade liberalization, therefore, backfires as developing nations
87. See Hilary K. Josephs, Learning From The Developing World, 14 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 231, 232 (2005) (referencing Virginia Postrel, Variety, The Spice of Life,
has measurable value. But It's Not Easy To Determine, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 2004 at
C2.)
88. GEORGE KENT, FREEDOM FROM WANT: THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD
195 (Georgetown University Press 2005).
89. Id.
90. See Lori Wallach & Deborah James, Why the WTO Doha Round Talks Have
Collapsed and a Path Forward, COMMON DREAMS (August 14, 2006) available at http://
www.commondreams.org/views06/0814-33.htm.
91. See Hauter, supra note 12, at 1078-81.
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having less diversified economies cannot afford the transition
costs involved with exporting select crops including labor force dis-
location and unemployment as farms fail due to low cost imported
food.92 There has been some pushback from LDCs, but it's too soon
to say how effective it will be.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND ITS EFFECTS ON
FOOD INSECURITY
International intellectual property regulation under the WTO
was lobbied for and obtained by powerful states and MNCs in
favor of universal standards for copyright and pharmaceutical
patent protection." The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) was sidelined as economic rights were at stake and lobby-
ists pushed for the broad economic control of GATT and the
WTO.94 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) operates under the auspices of GATT and
is critical for GATT members' agricultural policies as minimal pro-
tection of plant varieties and patenting of micro-organisms is
mandated by TRIPs."
The major problem with IP and its overlap with agricultural
policies is that the agricultural industry has become concentrated
in recent years as IP rules fuel the growth of a few major firms.9 6
For instance, a small number of major firms hold key patents in
enabling technologies and germplasm.9" This has wide reaching
effects on both access of developing nations to seeds and the neces-
sary research and development to grow local or regional agricul-
tural industry. This is unfair as fully developed nations with the
ability to produce patent-worthy invention are being incentivized
while developing nations with neither the industry nor the
resources for R&D, are being forced to use resources to establish
infrastructure (in the form of administrative bodies) that will vali-
date and recognize these foreign patents. This ensures that LDCs
will be held back in the area of agricultural innovation while the
developed nations reap the benefit of the TRIPS under the WTO.
In addition to TRIPs, the International Union for the Protec-
92. Id. at 1081-82
93. See THE FUTURE OF FOOD: A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND
RULES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIODIVERSITY AND FOOD SECURITY 6 (Geoff Tansey
& Tasmin Rajotte eds., Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2008).
94. See id. at 6-7.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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tion of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) protects breeders by
ensuring the protection of plant varieties." One of the major
problems with UPOV for developing nations is whether the re-
sowing of saved seeds by traditional small scale farmers is
allowed-it may or may not be in some cases.' Developing
nations have joined UPOV at a rapid rate not because of an inter-
nal need for plant variety protection, but because under TRIPs the
signatories must come up with a sui generis or patent system for
plant variety protection and UPOV is the only internationally rec-
ognized system.100 Developing nations have neither the resources
nor the time to come up with a sui generis regime tailored to the
nation. Moreover, the major developing nations put hard pressure
on developing nations to implement rules that they agree with or
are advantageous to the developed nations.10'
FARMING AND FOOD SECURITY
The food system is controlled by major agricultural players
from developed nations that corner key markets via patents and
plant variety protection.'0 2 Propagating plants that are from a
patented plant variety is not permitted under plant patenting
regimes instituted worldwide post-TRIPs."' Both TRIPs and
UPOV have been heavily criticized for a number of reasons:
- The requirement to provide for minimum IP protection
and plant variety protection limits a countries' flexibility
to decide what level of protection best suits the nation.
- There is no express exemption for farmers saving seed.
- UPOV provides excessive rights for breeders and, again,
no express exemption for farmers, which undermines
farmer's rights.
- Efforts to bridge the wide gap by food sovereignty advo-
cates does not create a universally applicable farmer's
rights to provision, but leaves the decision up to each
nation.'
98. Id. at 32.
99. See Briefing, supra note 70, at 38 (labeling the exemption as the "farmer's
privilege").
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id. at 47.
102. See id. (explaining that developed countries essentially control local
production in developing countries via these patent rights, which in turn stifle any
agricultural development).
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id. at 176.
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Problems arise especially in the context of plant breeder's
rights in many African countries. Article 27 (3) (b) of the TRIPS
agreements encourages the formulation of sui generis protection
regimes.'o6 The rest of the TRIPS agreement declines to offer pat-
ent protection to plant genes. As a result of this clause, many
parts of the world have formulated their own system and interpre-
tation of the rights of plant breeders.o6 One such system to arise
post-TRIPS is the International Convention for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).
UPOV has been criticized for not adequately protecting the
traditional knowledge of indigenous and local peoples. UPOV and
TRIPs combine to offer protections for large scale corporate seed
companies and professional breeders from developed countries."o'
In Africa the traditional method of farmer's development of seed
varieties happens over a period of time amongst a community of
farmers.0 8 These farmers have developed seeds that have gone
into circulation in Africa and have since found their way outside
the countries where they were developed."0 ' Many countries lack
adequate means to protect this traditional knowledge under a
scheme of intellectual property so these ideas and materials go
unprotected against unauthorized use by others. The fear is that
these others may in turn develop patentable products from the
traditional knowledge and owe nothing to the creators." 0
UPOV's provisions do not provide the adequate protections
that these local communities and small farmers need. In response
to the lack of protections for these groups the Organization of Afri-
can Unity developed the African Model Legislation for the Protec-
tion of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders,
and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources."' As in
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), one of the main areas of
focus was on establishing the rights of local communities over
105. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
[hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.
pdf.
106. EMANUEL OpoKu AwuKu, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE
SYSTEM: WORLD TRADE FORUM 111 (Daniel Wuger & Thomas Cottier eds., Cambridge
University Press 2008).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 112.
111. ORG. OF AFRICAN UNITY, MODEL LAw (2000) available at http:/ /www.
farmersrights.org/pdf/africa/AU/AU-model%2OlawOO.pdf
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their traditional knowledge and resources.11 2 UPOV along with
WIPO have come into conflict with the CDB and the Model Legis-
lation as to how to best achieve the desired results."'
During the Doha Round Meeting of the WTO, developing
countries sought and were granted a Ministerial Review of TRIPS
Article 27 (3)(b). Many saw this as an opportunity to revise the
language in the Article to bring into account the concerns raised
by UPOV, the Model Rules and the CBD."4 Currently the situa-
tion is somewhat unresolved. The majority of African States have
ratified TRIPS, along with its contentious Article 27 (3)(b).
Although a few states have adopted UPOV, the majority have not
on the premise that UPOV does not do enough to protect tradi-
tional knowledge and the methods and practices of indigenous
people."' The Model Rules have seen some results such as the
development of a sui generis system in Uganda in the form of The
National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA)." 6 If
the competing approaches discussed in this section can be harmo-
nized, the rights of indigenous communities and farmers in the
breeding of unique plant varieties can be protected. Of immediate
concern to many countries that are attempting to establish or
maintain food security in this context is that patent law will
deprive them of necessary seed and plants to achieve their goals.
Seeds and plants with traits that provide disease resistance, high
yield or post-harvest storage capacity may be inappropriately
privatized by transnational companies from developed countries,
and effectively precluded from use by LDC farmers."'
By protecting these rights in LDCs, agricultural sectors
within those countries can grow and be protected while they
achieve stability. However, the current situation is that many
countries must comply with the TRIPS provisions meaning that
small farmers' operations are not protected, and the traditional
knowledge used to create these things remains ripe for exploita-
tion. Therefore, farmer's rights are undermined as well their
security and stability. This in turn leads to a destabilization of
any food security/sovereignty measures a lesser developed country
may attempt.
112. See AwuKu, supra note 106, at 113.
113. Id. at 114.
114. Id. at 117.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 114-115.
117. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOOD SECURITY 90
(CAB International 2009).
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With the inherent lack of democracy in the WTO, 115 LDCs are
prevented from pushing through the reforms that they need to
establish food security and build their agricultural sectors to a
satisfactory point. The food sovereignty movement argues that
agriculture should be removed from WTO oversight and jurisdic-
tion."'9 Fundamental human rights issues are often sidelined by
the need to comply with rules and obligations of the WTO, WIPO,
TRIPS etc. International obligations should not compromise the
capacity of a country to establish its own food security. Rather,
developing countries should be granted exemptions from tariff
reductions for staple goods and foodstuffs so as to develop and
grow the vital parts of their infrastructure before they are subject
to the full brunt of global trade rules and regulations.
THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY APPROACH
The movement for food sovereignty (nutritional and agricul-
tural self-determination) has as perhaps its central tenet that the
community of nations will remove food from the WTO, making it
exempt from global trade rules. While the human right to food
has characteristics typical of other human rights, in some mea-
sure describing a narrow claim against the state for deprivation of
a right, food sovereignty more resembles the right of self-determi-
nation and is characterized by both the promise and fuzziness of
that term. In general, food sovereignty refers to a self-empower-
ment of communities and nations to collectively decide upon pro-
duction, marketing, and consumption of food outside of the
strictures of the global trade system.
A meeting of over 500 representatives from over 80 countries
(including farmers, indigenous peoples, and a wide variety of civil
society groups) in Mali in February, 2007 led to the establishment
of the "six pillars of food sovereignty," a point of departure for
developing nations attempting to take back control of food secur-
ity.120 The food sovereignty movement informs the struggle of
developing nations against globalized and industrialized food sys-
tems where these have obscured local interests. The "Six Pillars of
Food Sovereignty" are described as follows:
1. Focuses on Food for People, putting the right to food at
118. See CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY 1 (American
Enterprise Institute Press 2001).
119. See RoSSET, supra note 10.
120. Patrick Mulvany, Food Sovereignty Comes of Age, Food Ethics, Autumn 2007,
at 19; see also Tansey & Rajotte eds., supra note 93, at 177-178.
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the centre of food, agriculture, livestock and fisheries
policies; and rejects the proposition that food is just
another commodity or component for international agri-
business.
2. Values Food Providers and respects their rights: and
rejects those policies, actions and programs that under-
value them, threaten their livelihoods and eliminate
them.
3. Localises Food Systems, bringing food providers and
consumers closer together; and rejects governance struc-
tures, agreements and practices that depend on and pro-
mote unsustainable and inequitable international trade
and give power to remote and unaccountable
corporations.
4. Puts Control Locally over territory, land, grazing, water,
seeds, livestock and fish populations; and rejects the
privatization of natural resources through laws, com-
mercial contracts and intellectual property rights
regimes.
5. Builds Knowledge and Skills that conserve, develop and
manage localized food production and harvesting sys-
tems; and rejects technologies that undermine, threaten
or contaminate these, e.g. genetic engineering.
6. Works with Nature in diverse, agroecological production
and harvesting methods that maximize ecosystem func-
tions and improve resilience and adaptation, especially
in the face of climate change; and rejects energy-inten-
sive industrialized methods which damage the environ-
ment and contribute to global warming.121
There are reasons to hope that the self-determination implicit in
the food sovereignty movement has already captured some degree
of public dissatisfaction with extant patterns of global food pro-
duction and trade, and that it might spawn further critique, pro-
test, and provide impetus for a global rethinking of food delivery
from farm to table. At the very least it provides space for arguing
for local control of food in place of the passivity sometimes implicit
in conventional discussions of the applicability and enforceability
of the human right to food. Food sovereignty calls for a systematic
re-examination of agricultural and food policy specifically placing
local control over food-related decision making at the center of its
model. Re-democratizing agriculture and food policy has to be a
continuing effort at the heart of global advocacy in this area; food
sovereignty offers a critical vantage point from which to mount
121. Id.
135
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1
critiques of the corporate and free trade driven direction of trade
law and policy in recent decades.
CONCLUSION
Clearly one of the major obstacles to achieving just outcomes
in the trade and food debates is the apparently chronic deficit of
democratic representation in IFIs, the WTO, and in trade negotia-
tions across the board. Issues critical to food security among the
poor in developing countries are systematically discounted or side-
lined in these fora. How has mobility of capital and free trade
become so normatively dominant and mobility of labor so unthink-
able? How has trade liberalization, with its promise of equal
access to world markets, become so lopsided in favor of powerful
states? There must be a sustained and solidarity based effort to
resist and reframe the nature of these debates: biodiversity and
food security, ecology and sustainability, must come to challenge
the hegemony of the contract based investment/return model.
Although the main arguments in the literature on food inse-
curity range from reform proposals for the justiciability of the
right to food to trade exclusions and exemptions for developing
countries in the food sector, the major issue would instead appear
to be whether to pursue a reform agenda or remove food from the
trade paradigm altogether. In combination and pursued in paral-
lel, right to food and food sovereignty approaches offer a consoli-
dated and coherent strategic approach to the problem of structural
disadvantage to developing countries and resulting food insecu-
rity. The Global North must be forced to admit its part in and its
benefit from this unequal system, take responsibility for these
inequities and promote change.
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